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CONTROLLING DRUG USERS: FORMS OF POWER AND 
BEHAVIOURAL REGULATION IN DRUG TREATMENT SERVICES
Matthew Bacon* and Toby Seddon
This article examines the control practices used in drug treatment services to regulate the behav-
iour of people with drug problems. Drawing on an extensive qualitative study, we developed a 
conceptual framework, integrating the notion of responsive regulation with Wrong’s sociology of 
power. The picture that emerges is of a complex ‘web of controls’, combining diverse forms of power 
and control techniques, used to steer action and shape behavioural outcomes. It is argued that we 
can understand these control practices within drug treatment as part of broader strategies for the 
social regulation of the poor, built on deep-rooted hybrids of punishment and welfare. The article 
concludes with the suggestion that drug treatment represents an important site for understanding 
penal power today.
Key Words:  drug treatment, drug users, behavioural regulation, control, power, penal 
welfarism
Introduction
The idea of drug treatment—providing medical interventions to help people with drug 
problems—dates back to the mid-19th century. It developed alongside the emergence 
of the notion that addiction was a disease (Berridge 1979). Kerr’s (1886) celebrated 
textbook on Inebriety sought to compile the ‘state of the art’ of treatment approaches, 
which ranged from prescribing bromide sedatives through to abrupt or gradual with-
drawal. From the start, an important strand running through ideas about drug treat-
ment was the coercive coninement of ‘addicts’ within either prisons, lunatic asylums or 
specialist inebriate reformatories, where treatment would often be an austere ‘combin-
ation of food, work and religion’ (Berridge 2012: 22).
Contemporary drug treatment is in some ways not so different from its 19th century 
forerunners (for an overview of its evolution, see Mold 2008). It remains largely a med-
icalized enterprise—typically funded through health budgets and/or insurance—with 
prescribing of substitute medication and supervised detox amongst the mainstream of 
approaches. Coercion is also still an important part of the treatment repertoire. The 
need for control can be partly explained by the fact that treatment is often an intense 
emotional experience, which, when combined with drug dependence and withdrawal, 
elevates the risk of conlict or disorder. Studies of health professionals’ attitudes to-
wards and interactions with people who use drugs show that they are generally viewed 
as aggressive, dishonest, impatient, manipulative and uncooperative (van Boekel et al. 
2013). Stated thus, there are obvious pragmatic reasons for imposing restrictions and 
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controls. The available evidence indicates, however, that ‘the majority of drug users do 
not behave in this way and yet they are often tarred by the same brush’ (Lloyd 2010: 32).
This raises a critical question. Why might control practices be so important within 
a health care setting such as drug treatment, particularly when evidence suggests that 
the potential for disorder may be less acute than some fear? What does this tell us about 
the drug treatment enterprise? One way to understand this is through the literature 
on the relationship between punishment and welfare. As Garland (2017: 94) observes, 
a foundational insight from the study of this relationship is that institutions of pun-
ishment and welfare are jointly involved as ‘front-line, street-level modes of governing 
[the poor]’. From this perspective, it is unsurprising that drug treatment settings are 
characterized by both care and control, as the hybridity of penal-welfare strategies has 
a long history. Indeed, we can understand the birth of drug treatment as part of the 
wider story that Garland (1985) tells of the assembly of the institutions and ideolo-
gies of penal welfarism in the late-19th century and which Seddon (2010: 56–99) then 
traces through the 20th-century evolution of liberal governance. In recent decades, 
the conjoining of crime control and health concerns within treatment has intensiied, 
shaped by the transition to neo-liberalism and the ensuing criminalization of drug 
policy (Seddon et al. 2012: 23–45). Today, the populations in drug treatment and crim-
inal justice systems continue to overlap signiicantly and are characterized by high rates 
of unemployment, low income and other indicators of socio-economic disadvantage 
(Jones et al. 2007; Prison Reform Trust 2017). Both systems are elements in the social 
regulation of the poor.
It is these control practices that are the focus of this article. They constitute a sig-
niicantly under-researched area in the literature. There is a small body of research on 
associations between methadone maintenance treatment and social control, which em-
phasizes the repressive functions, power imbalances and institutional stigma of metha-
done regimes (see Neale 2013). In an unsettling account, Bourgois (2000: 167) argues 
that methadone ‘represents the state’s attempt to inculcate moral discipline into the 
hearts, minds, and bodies of deviants who reject sobriety and economic productivity’. 
However, aside from a few studies of therapeutic communities (De Leon 2000; Rawlings 
and Yates 2001), we know remarkably little about the mechanisms and practices of con-
trol in treatment settings, especially when we look more broadly than just methadone 
prescribing.
This article draws on the indings of an extensive qualitative study across a range of 
drug treatment services in England, including community-based and residential pro-
vision. Its analytic focus is on the control and ordering activities of drug workers that 
are aimed at regulating the behaviour of service users. We adopt Black’s (2002: 26) def-
inition of regulation as the ‘sustained and focussed attempt to alter the behaviour of 
others according to deined standards or purposes with the intention of producing a 
broadly deined outcome or outcomes’. Our critical ethos was to conduct a concrete 
empirical study of practices, asking the question of how drug workers actually get things 
done in treatment services. In so doing, we contribute to and advance a promising area 
of scholarship that applies regulatory theory in the drug policy context (e.g. Ritter 
2010; Seddon 2010: 100–121). This literature is principally concerned with better ap-
proaches and strategies for regulating drug markets. It has not involved signiicant 
empirical research, with the exception of Seddon et al. (2012: 106–117), which uses a 
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regulation perspective to understand how courts direct drug-using offenders into treat-
ment services and the dificulties experienced in securing compliance.
In the irst section of the article, we set out a conceptual framework for the analysis. 
After outlining our research methods, we turn to the indings to explore the nature, 
purposes and functioning of control practices. We use the building blocks from our 
framework—rules and principles; discretion and responsiveness; forms of power and 
control techniques; ladder of escalation—to structure the presentation. In conclusion, 
we consider the wider criminological signiicance of our indings, arguing that drug 
treatment represents an important site for understanding the connections between 
penal and social control that make up contemporary penality.
Forms of Power and Behavioural Regulation: A Conceptual Framework
For our study, we sought to develop a framework for understanding how control was 
exercised in drug treatment settings. The social science literature contains a rich seam 
on the concepts of power and control. Rather than navigating through this extensive 
and complex body of work at the outset of the project, we proceeded primarily on an in-
ductive basis, attempting to build a framework up from the data, and moving back and 
forth between concepts and data as we sought to make sense of our empirical material.
Adopting this approach, the notion of ‘responsive regulation’ emerged as particularly 
useful for our purposes, as it ‘it’ closely with the control practices we were observing 
in our ieldwork sites. The most inluential presentation of the theory is by Ayres and 
Braithwaite (1992), who pulled together insights from earlier studies on corporate 
crime, mine safety and business regulation. The core idea is that regulators need to be 
responsive to the behaviour of those they are seeking to regulate and highly attuned 
to the context in which they are operating. Discretion is, therefore, of central import-
ance to effective regulation. The ‘regulatory pyramid’ offers a heuristic that captures a 
key premise: the strategy of escalating the severity of interventions until compliance is 
achieved. The presumption is that dynamic regulatory efforts should begin at the base 
of the pyramid, with the most restorative, dialogue-based remedies available. Only if 
these persuasive measures fail, should one move up the pyramid to increasingly more 
punitive or coercive sanctions, culminating in the biggest ‘stick’ at the apex. The know-
ledge that escalated enforcement is the inevitable consequence of non-compliance and 
that the sanction at the apex exists should be suficient to drive down most of the regu-
latory action towards the lower levels of the pyramid.
Although the pyramid heuristic is a guide to strategies for regulatory enforcement, it 
is important to note Braithwaite’s (2011: 491–2) reminder that this does not mean that 
regulation simply concerns rule compliance. In an earlier paper, Braithwaite (2002a) 
sets out an account of the interplay between rules and principles in effective regulation, 
suggesting that the more complex the phenomenon, the less useful it is to rely on rules 
alone. He argues for regulators to develop rules-principles conigurations that are re-
sponsive to their speciic context.
The theory of responsive regulation has been tested and reined across diverse sec-
tors (see Braithwaite 2011). As our analysis progressed, however, it became clear that 
we needed to supplement the regulatory pyramid with a more detailed set of categories 
to describe the speciic forms of power utilized by drug treatment workers. Inluenced 
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by its employment in some of the policing and prisons literature (e.g. Crewe 2009; 
Bottoms and Tankebe 2012), we turned to the sociologist Wrong’s work on power, as set 
out in his 1979 book, which has subsequently gone through several editions. Although 
Wrong’s work pre-dates that of Braithwaite and his colleagues, it includes a very similar 
notion of the ‘ladder of escalation’, referring to the need sometimes to move up the 
ladder ‘from the mildest and most consensual to the most punitive forms of power in 
order to obtain compliance’ (Wrong 2002: 71). This congruence with the regulatory 
pyramid encouraged us to explore how we might bring the two together.
Wrong differentiates force, manipulation, persuasion and authority as distinct forms 
of power. Authority is deined as ‘successfully ordering or forbidding’ (Wrong 2002: 
35) and divided into ive subtypes: coercive, inducement, legitimate, competent and personal. 
These eight forms of power constitute his basic framework and are explained in more 
detail below. Although the forms of power are presented as discrete entities, the divi-
sions between them are blurred in reality as ‘most power relations are mixed, exhib-
iting qualities of contrasting types interwoven into an apparently inseparable blend’ 
(Wrong 2002: 67). Wrong (2002: 73) argues that it is advantageous to be capable of 
exercising multiple forms of power, especially in exercising control over a plurality of 
subjects with diverse motivations for compliance.
Wrong does not organize the forms of power hierarchically but we argue that there is 
a tendency in practice for some forms to be drawn on more within ‘softer’ approaches 
to securing compliance and others more within ‘harder’ strategies (Crewe 2011; Skinns 
et  al. 2017). Situated primarily—but not exclusively—at the base of the regulatory 
pyramid, are competent authority and personal authority. The former is based on specialist 
knowledge and skills, as in the prototypical example of the doctor–patient relation-
ship. In drug treatment contexts, it exists when a service user complies with the advice 
or instructions of the drug worker out of belief in the worker’s expertise. The latter 
involves drug workers exercising power on the basis of their personal signiicance to 
the service user, typically stemming from the affective bond that develops between 
worker and client during the treatment process (Meier et al. 2005). For drug workers 
who have competent and/or personal authority, service users comply with a recommen-
dation because of its source rather than its content. Persuasion, on the other hand, the 
foundation of responsive regulation, occurs when the service user acts on the advice of 
the worker having independently assessed it in light of his/her own goals. Deliberate 
attempts to inluence the behaviour of another where the desired effect has not been 
explicitly communicated constitute manipulation. Alternatively, drug workers may ap-
peal to the self-interest of service users by offering incentives for compliance. Authority 
by inducement includes the provision of services and the power to prescribe substitute 
drugs and what are termed ‘contingency management’ techniques (e.g. providing i-
nancial incentives for attendance at treatment) (Prendergast et al. 2006).
Legitimate authority is a power relation in which there is ‘an acknowledged right to com-
mand’ and an ‘obligation to obey’ (Wrong 2002: 49). It is deployed at all levels of the 
pyramid but may be particularly useful when persuasive efforts have failed. A legitimate 
authority can induce voluntary compliance by appealing to shared norms. For Wrong, 
these norms prescribe obedience to the authority rather than the content of the com-
mands issued by the authority. This resonates with notions of legitimacy and procedural 
justice, which, building on the works of Beetham (1991) and Tyler (1990), respectively, 
have become inluential within criminology (e.g. Crawford and Hucklesby 2013). A key 
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inding of this work is that perceptions of legitimacy and fairness are critical to regula-
tory effectiveness.
At the ‘hard’ end of the power spectrum, corresponding to the apex of the regula-
tory pyramid, drug workers have coercive authority and may use (threats of) force to gain 
compliance. Potent means of force available to drug workers include the withdrawal of 
prescriptions and the exclusion of service users from treatment. If people are accus-
tomed to, or dependent on, the resources provided by treatment services, the possibility 
of cessation can be employed as a threat and transform a power relation initially based 
on inducement into one based on coercion. ‘Lighter’ forms of coercion may also be 
built into the everyday routines of drug treatment services. Examples include manda-
tory drug testing and daily pickups of substitute drugs.
Figure 1 summarizes how Wrong’s taxonomy of forms of power maps onto the regula-
tory pyramid. Conceptually, we can understand the pyramid as describing the strategy 
for behavioural regulation, whilst the forms of power are the speciic techniques de-
ployed to execute that strategy.
Research Methods
Fieldwork was undertaken in six drug treatment services in three regions of England 
between October 2011 and July 2012. Drawing on indings from a national survey of 
Drug and Alcohol Action Teams (DAATs) (Bacon and Seddon 2013), we selected re-
gions where various techniques of behavioural regulation appeared to be widely used 
and then sites within each of these regions to capture the spread of service providers 
and treatment modalities. Our focus was on residential and structured community-
based services. Table 1 provides a breakdown of the research sites and participants in 
the interview strand of the research.
The study employed a mixed-methods design consisting of three interconnecting 
elements of data collection. First, service user handbooks, various written agreements 
and other documents were analysed to identify the principles, rules and sanctioning 
processes of the treatment services. Second, the main strand of the methodology com-
prised 108 semi-structured interviews with staff members and service users. Interviews 
explored a wide range of topics relating to behavioural control. We interviewed service 
Figure 1. Integrated conceptual framework.
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managers and frontline practitioners. Service user interviewees were selected purpos-
ively to ensure a range of views were represented and that there was a balance in the 
sample in terms of age, gender, ethnicity, treatment history and type/severity of drug 
problem. There was a mix of users subject to court orders and those there ‘voluntarily’, 
although the latter formed the substantial majority. All interviews were audio recorded 
and transcribed with each participant assigned an anonymous unique identiier. 
Third, over 300 hours of direct observation were carried out in waiting rooms, com-
munal areas, group sessions and staff meetings. This method provided a fruitful way of 
deepening our understanding of staff–client interactions and the everyday operation 
of power and regulation in treatment settings. Interviews provided an opportunity to 
ask about observed incidents.
Findings
Regulatory goals: rules and principles
In each of the research sites, there were systems of rules and principles in place to 
regulate behaviour. Following Braithwaite (2002a), we conceive rules as speciic pre-
scriptions and principles as prescribing unspeciic actions that can justify rules and 
bring about mutual orientations. Service provider ‘rules’—which were interchangeably 
referred to as ‘boundaries’, ‘expectations’, ‘guidelines’ and ‘responsibilities’—were con-
tained within the terms and conditions of entry into treatment. To gain access, service 
users had to agree to abide by the rules and accept the consequences of non-compli-
ance. This involved the signing of various contract-like agreements and is best con-
ceptualized as a form of contractual governance (Bacon and Seddon 2013). It implies 
a reciprocity in which the service user is required to assume responsibility for their 
own treatment, a strategy of ‘responsibilization’, which O’Malley (1992) identiied as 
characteristic of neo-liberal forms of government (e.g. Crewe 2009; Moore 2009). An 
emphasis on individual responsibility and enacting model citizenship and sociality is 
central to ‘new recovery’ discourses, policies and practices (Fomiatti et al. 2019).
Table 1. Research sites and participants
Drug treatment service Interviewees
Staff Service users
1  Voluntary sector community-based service located in a town in the North  
West of England
7 11
2 Public sector community-based service located in a borough of London 4 5
3  Voluntary sector community-based service located in a borough of 
London that not only specializes in alcohol treatment but also provides a 
12-week abstinence-oriented day programme for people who use drugs
8 10
4  Voluntary sector therapeutic community located in a city in the West 
Midlands that provides a 12-week residential rehabilitation programme 
6 14
5  Public sector community-based service for female sex 
workers located in a city in the West Midlands 
8 19
6  Voluntary sector community-based service located in a city in the 
West Midlands that provides a 12-week aftercare day programme
5 11
  Totals 38 70
BACON AND SEDDON
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Rules were codiied in a range of documents. Staff explained that these documents—
‘code of conduct’, ‘house rules agreement’ and ‘service user charter’—incorporated 
national policy and clinical guidelines. They had also often been developed in con-
sultation with service users to address the speciic needs of the service. Such engage-
ment could improve regulatory design, enhance the legitimacy of rules and encourage 
empowerment (Van Hout and McElrath 2012). The responsibilities placed on service 
users were set out alongside their rights and what the service committed to providing 
for them:
[T]he charter … is very much about a dual responsibility, an expectation from both sides … It’s about 
what we will do, what they can expect from us, and what we would expect in return (Site 1, Service 
Manager (#103)).
In addition to the right to treatment—which acted as an inducement—service users 
had the right to be dealt with in a respectful manner, to receive full information about 
their treatment, to be involved in decisions affecting them and to have their views lis-
tened to. This commitment to fairness—in effect, to procedural justice—helped gen-
erate a form of legitimate authority.
‘Cardinal rules’ prohibited behaviour that caused actual or potential harm and could 
result in legal proceedings against the service. They included no violence, no stealing, 
no discrimination, no breaches of conidentiality and no illicit drugs in or around the 
premises. The ‘no drugs’ rule covered use, possession and supply, as well as organizing 
deals, exchanging information about dealers and ‘inappropriate’ drug talk.
When someone comes in intoxicated you are not going to issue the script because it puts them at risk 
of overdose. It’s that simple and that’s a boundary that’s not going to get shifted … [I]f someone did 
go and have an overdose we wouldn’t have a leg to stand on (Site 2, Drug Worker (#110)).
‘General rules’, on the other hand, contained a mix of principles and expectations 
relating to the day-to-day operation of the service. For example, service users were ex-
pected to behave ‘in a manner that is respectful and consistent with the therapeutic 
approach’, ‘cooperate with staff’ and ‘engage fully with all aspects of your treatment 
package’. They were also expected to attend appointments on time and provide urine, 
saliva and/or breath samples as requested. As is characteristic of residential services, 
Site 4 was markedly different in terms of the volume of general rules. They covered 
everything from dress code, meal times, telephone calls and visits to restrictions on lit-
erature, music and television.
Rules were designed to create a safe environment, impose conditions of order and 
structure engagement with the treatment programme. Staff and service users frequently 
commented that, without the rules, the service would descend into ‘chaos’. Moreover, 
the rules acted as a form of communication system, which provided service users with 
a guide to social values, norms and expectations both within and outside treatment 
settings. As De Leon (2000) suggests, by internalizing models of pro-social behaviour, 
drug workers hoped that service users would make positive changes to their lifestyles, 
take active responsibility for their futures and become functioning members of society:
What you’re doing with all this, beyond the methadone, beyond the group work, and everything, 
you’re grooming people for reality. Now, if they think they can go out and talk to people in the Job 
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Centre, or their boss, or a policeman like that, their feet aren’t going to touch [the ground] (Site 1, 
Drug Worker (#98/9)).
[The rules] are about the best way to live in harmony in a house … inding your role in society and 
being able to contribute something back. So all the rules are about that really: that you don’t hide 
under your hat; that you spend time with your peers eating; that you spend time mingling with them 
rather than just watching the telly and mumbling to each other; that you get up at a set time so you’re 
not interrupting group by walking in late; that you’re clean and keep the house clean and make an 
effort (Site 4, Service Manager (#92/3)).
Although some described them as ‘common sense’, service users tended not to imme-
diately grasp the purpose of all the rules when they irst entered treatment, not least 
because they were feeling somewhat disorientated, vulnerable and inundated with in-
formation. To help develop their understanding, rules were explained as part of the 
induction process, embedded within key work sessions and discussed during group ac-
tivities. As service users engaged with the programme, embraced the justiicatory prin-
ciples for rules and experienced positive treatment outcomes, the majority recognized 
the ways in which compliance contributed to their recovery:
I can understand people thinking, ‘Oh, bloody rules! It’s all rules, rules, rules!’ I can understand that 
because we’re all like that the irst week … [T]he longer you’re here, you get to realise, ‘Well that’s 
why there is that rule. That’s why there is that rule’ (Site 4, Service User (#28/9)).
I just see a routine, no rules; I don’t see it as a rule system, I see it as an opportunity to fucking sort 
my head out, sort my life out and stay off drugs (Site 3, Service User (#64/5)).
Service users rarely complained about the rules or contested their legitimacy (though 
they did occasionally ‘kick off’ when staff withheld methadone on the grounds of late-
ness or intoxication). Only the highly regimented restrictions of the therapeutic com-
munity were called into question on a regular basis. Residents who took issue said they 
were ‘childish’, ‘dictatorish’ and in need of explanation:
When you eat, you can’t leave your table for like … half an hour – not even to clear your plate … You 
have to sit there, at your table … sometimes it’s like jail. And I’ve got a bad back, so just sitting there 
at the table all the time, that just does my back in … I think that’s one ridiculous rule (Site 4, Service 
User (#38)).
Some of the rules, you know, if there’d just be like … an explanation just to say we’re doing this be-
cause, you know, it’s a lot easier for people to accept it. Because you can, if you’re feeling a bit para-
noid, which some of us do from time to time, you can think they’re doing that out of spite (Site 4, 
Service User (#37)).
Discretion and responsiveness
There are often disparities between the rulebook and how rules are applied in prac-
tice. To understand how rules operated in drug treatment services, therefore, consider-
ation was given to the discretion exercised by staff and the various factors that shaped 
their decision-making processes. Discretion was also central to the power relations and 
sanctioning processes discussed below. What we are concerned with here are the ‘rules 
of thumb’ that enabled drug workers to ‘make contextual judgements as to when it is 
safe to get the eficiency beneits of following the rule and when it is not’ (Braithwaite 
BACON AND SEDDON
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2002a: 68). Our indings are very reminiscent of Ugwudike’s (2010) research on how 
probation oficers enforce community sanctions, illustrating the ‘family resemblance’ 
between penal and social control.
Service managers acknowledged that rules and enforcement practices were lex-
ible. Discretion was necessary because drug workers were expected to ‘know the client 
group’, understand their needs and be responsive to the unique circumstances of indi-
vidual transgressions:
We always have to look at what was going on for them that day, because girls come in here who’ve 
been attacked the night before, their heads are a mess; so you have to know the client group and 
know why they have behaved in a certain way (Site 5, Drug Worker (#44)).
As long as they operated within ‘professional boundaries’, staff members had the 
autonomy to decide when and how to make allowances or challenge non-compliant 
behaviour:
I’ll put up with someone that threatened to cut my throat but if they try to sell drugs, no (Site 1, Drug 
Worker (#81)).
Each staff member here’s very, very individual, works in very, very different ways … Some are very 
‘right, this is the line, you will not cross it’ sort of thing. And that’s not criticising anybody; they all 
work in massively different ways, but everyone seems to have great outcomes (Site 6, Drug Worker 
(#45)).
Some are quite strict and will come in and say it’s 11 o’clock, the television’s going to go off, it’s bed-
time. And some will come in and say well, you know, I’m really sorry guys, it’s 11 o’clock, you know I’ve 
got to turn this television off … And some will sit at the desk, and when the ilm ends, they’ll come 
and say I didn’t realise the time … It’s down to the individual, that consistency; I ind varies quite a 
lot (Site 4, Service User (#23)).
In addition to training and experiential learning, the varying norms and values of drug 
workers affected how they exercised discretion. Take the following interview excerpt, 
e.g., in which the service manager is explaining her approach to challenging service 
users about their language:
I think if you don’t allow people to use the service because they swear a lot or because their manners 
are different from yours then you are making huge judgments on individuals that actually need sup-
port and that it isn’t our place to dictate to somebody how they should be in relation to the way they 
speak or the way they behave unless they’re harming somebody else (Site 6, Service Manager (#48)).
For this manager, people ‘can only be themselves’ and treatment services should aim 
to be places of ‘total acceptance to everybody who walks through the door’. Aside from 
racist, sexist and homophobic language and verbal exchanges that were intimidating or 
caused offence to others, she would only pull service users up for swearing if they had 
chosen to address it as part of their care plan.
Drug workers emphasized the importance of discretion when dealing with new en-
trants and service users with chaotic lifestyles, learning disabilities and/or mental 
health issues. Relapses and using on top of substitute medications were viewed as part 
of the process. Flexibility was, therefore, imperative in order to lower initial dropout 
rates and allow service users to adjust to the rules:
FORMS OF POWER AND BEHAVIOURAL REGULATION IN DRUG TREATMENT SERVICES
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You can’t start giving [service users] rules, cos they’ll just rebel against it and they’ll just tell you 
where to stick it and you’ll never see them again (Site 6, Service User (#11)).
When deciding on how best to act, staff would take into account whether the service 
user in question was a irst-time, occasional or habitual rule breaker. They would also 
assess their motivation and readiness to change:
There’s times when people, e.g., have had a drink a couple of days ago and want to come into our re-
lapse prevention group and in theory they shouldn’t have had a drink for ten days … But then you’ve 
got somebody sitting there who wants to come to a group and needs support. Now what do you do? 
Do you kick him out and say no, no we’re going to hold that; sometimes you might. If you know the 
person you think well actually you’ve been doing this a lot. Somebody’s just started on that road, you 
can see they’re really trying, you know; it’s not always black and white. So you need those rules, yes, 
but you need commonsense to apply them (Site 3, Drug Worker (#59)).
Staff had more discretion when addressing minor incidents and enforcing general 
rules. Cardinal rules, on the other hand, were strictly enforced because the prohib-
ited acts could make the environment unsafe or undermine the treatment process. 
Nevertheless, while the scope for discretion was limited, we observed discrepancies in 
enforcement practices. This is evidenced in the following examples, in which staff ex-
plain why they decided not to uphold the zero tolerance approach to drug offences:
We have had a client once, go to give another client some drugs … I didn’t ban her, because it’s that 
kind of street mentality that they’re trying to help somebody else. She can’t get her script, ‘Here you 
are, have some gear’, you know what I mean? (Site 5, Service Manager (#50)).
If someone’s clean or trying and they’ve got cannabis on them, due to the intense smell that cannabis 
gives off, I would rather give them an airtight container to put it in than let them walk down the street 
and be arrested, or let people give them funny looks, or ask them whether they’ve got any on them, 
be approached. It’s just over safety (Site 5, Drug Worker (#42/3)).
Although discretion was seen as necessary for providing personalized care and dealing 
with incidents in a responsive manner, drug workers strove to adhere to the rules and 
follow procedure so as to avoid inconsistencies or differential treatment. In reality, how-
ever, these unintended consequences were inevitable. Disparities in the application of 
rules left some service users feeling uncertain about what was expected of them or as 
though they had been treated unfairly. Perceptions of favouritism or ‘special treatment’ 
could lead to arguments, complaints and resentment. In this sense, there was a con-
tinual tension between responsiveness and perceptions of legitimacy, as Irwin-Rogers 
(2017) also found in the context of the penal system in his study of post-custodial super-
vision in Approved Premises.
Forms of power and control techniques
Drug workers exercised multiple forms of power to regulate the behaviour of service 
users. Although drug workers viewed their role as fundamentally deined by the pro-
vision of care and ‘collaborative capacity building’ (Braithwaite 2011: 475)  through 
support and education, it was also acknowledged that treatment contained a signii-
cant element of control. Furthermore, whilst drug workers did not explicitly identify 
as controlling authorities, they recognized that there was a power differential between 
BACON AND SEDDON
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themselves and their clients. Some described the performance of care and control 
functions as a balancing act:
I don’t want a service user to get in their head ‘Oh, I’m going to come in here and they’re going to 
be my mates and it’s ine’, because they’re not going to get anything from that … I think there’s a 
ine line; I want them to come here and be happy, enjoy it and be comfortable and feel safe, but at 
the same time they need to be developing … So it’s inding that balance without being too much of 
a dragon (Site 6, Drug Worker (#45)).
Striking the right balance between ‘mate’ and ‘dragon’ was a crucial factor in suc-
cessful engagement and dialogic forms of control at the base of the regulatory pyramid. 
Indeed, service users regularly attributed much of their progress to relationships with 
staff members and how they were treated:
I really believe that fucking I’ve ended up relating with staff members, that’s what’s made me decide 
whether I’m going to throw myself into this or not. Like I says, I can sign whatever they wanted to give 
me to sign [code of conduct], and it don’t really matter. It really does matter how you’re welcomed 
when you walk through that door (Site 6, Service User (#09)).
Service users valued drug workers who ‘don’t judge you’, are ‘prepared to listen if you 
need to talk’ and will ‘go into bat for you if you play ball’. Such workers were present 
in all of our research sites. In Site 2, however, which had up to 600 service users on the 
books, drug workers had heavy caseloads, which meant they spent less time with their 
clients and found it harder to built rapport and establish dialogue. It also meant that 
meetings were sometimes preoccupied with paperwork and overly instructive in nature:
A few people I’ve met working in the service … didn’t give me the feeling that they really want to 
help. Not a relation with friendship of course, but really listen to you and follow your progress … 
[T]hey’re just illing charts: ‘You’re screening okay. Got your sample or not? Okay so next time I’m 
going to take your script off you’. Sometimes it just seems that they get bored with talking … It’s 
‘Fill that, ill that, why don’t you do that’ or just like reading a book and telling you (Site 2, Service 
User (#113)).
Working at the base of the regulatory pyramid, drug workers had competent authority, 
derived from their professional knowledge and skills. Service users complied because 
they believed in the worker’s ability to decide which actions would best serve their inter-
ests. This type of authority is evident in the following interview excerpt—mixed with 
legitimacy—in which the service user is relecting on being told by a staff member that 
he was not allowed to wear his baseball cap indoors:
You’ve got to respect their knowledge and, you know, they’re doing it for your beneit, although you 
can’t actually understand how they’re doing it, but you know they’re doing it for your beneit … [I]t’s 
gratitude as well; they’re treating you with respect by helping you, so you know, the least you can do 
is treat them with respect and stick by their rules (Site 4, Service User (#37)).
In practice, competent authority tended to be combined with persuasion and the in-
volvement of service users in decisions about their treatment and behaviour. Drug 
workers provided service users with advice, which they then assessed and acted on in 
light of their own goals:
FORMS OF POWER AND BEHAVIOURAL REGULATION IN DRUG TREATMENT SERVICES
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A lot of the work that we do is about that … therapeutic relationship between you and the client, 
them trusting you and you guiding them – not telling them, but guiding them – where they want to 
go (Site 5, Drug Worker (#44)).
Yeah, he’s my key worker … he talks to me and he says, like, he gives me advice, but the rest is up to 
me, isn’t it? He can’t do nothing about it; he could talk to me all day long, it’s up to me if I listen, or 
I don’t (Site 2, Service User (#114).
The next quotation demonstrates how a service manager used a blend of competent au-
thority and persuasion to censor service users. When compared to the above example 
on the question of swearing, it further reveals how responsiveness and discretion almost 
inevitably lead to inconsistent practice:
They’re always told not to swear when I hear it. And then we had a massive debate last week about, 
‘Well, why? It’s my tongue, I’ll speak what I like, and that’s how I express myself’. And I said: ‘But 
I ind it offensive and unnecessary. More to the point you just don’t sound very good; you don’t sound 
like you’re coming across very well.’ And from there I’m taking it even a step further, like an NLP 
[Neuro Linguistic Programming] step, of if you can start to control the way that you speak and how 
you come across, you’re going to start to control and have power over your triggers, your cravings, 
your behaviours (Site 4, Service Manager (#92/3)).
When a therapeutic relationship had been established, it was possible for drug workers 
to shape the behaviour of service users through personal authority. Many service users 
said they ‘look up to’ members of staff. Owing to this affective bond, breaking the rules 
felt like they were letting their drug worker down. These feelings could be harnessed 
to gain compliance. However, exercising ‘tough love’ had to be carefully managed as it 
could have negative emotional effects and increase the risk of relapse. Here, we can see 
how a drug worker used personal authority in response to a positive drug test and the 
impact it had on the service user:
It was the D-word. And she went in, she said – she started crying – ‘I’m so sorry’. I said, ‘I’m just so 
disappointed with you’. It’s ‘disappointed’ – they can’t bear it. She was sobbing (Site 5, Drug Worker 
(#88)).
I just think they’ve done so much to help me, so by letting them down I’m letting myself down and 
if I let myself down then I feel shitty and I’ll probably go out and smoke (Site 5, Service User (#18)).
Persuasion was also supplemented with authority by inducement. In fact, it could be 
argued that inducement is an inherent part of care planning and key work sessions in 
that drug workers are able to inluence how service users go about realizing their goals. 
A powerful incentive for compliance in prescribing services (Sites 1, 2 and 5) was the 
prospect of moving from the supervised consumption of substitute drugs on a daily 
basis to take-away doses. A system of ‘privileges’ was used in Site 4 to reward residents 
for their length and level of engagement. Privileges included outside visits and a choice 
of house duties. Rewards were widely used in the form of praise and the celebration of 
success, which Braithwaite (2002b: 24) suggests have ‘unequivocally positive effects’ on 
compliance. For those who completed treatment, there was also the possibility of ap-
plying to ambassador schemes:
It’s an incentive to get clean. I can be an ambassador in a year and people will see me clean… If I can 
get this under my belt people are going to be thinking, ‘Fucking hell … if he’s done it, there’s hope 
for us all’ (Site 1, Service User (#56)).
BACON AND SEDDON
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In a broad sense, manipulation was widespread in treatment settings in that drug 
workers manipulated the ield by acting on information, rewards and deprivations 
(Wrong 2002: 28). Their understanding of the importance of fairness, however, meant 
that intentions were not deliberately concealed from service users in an attempt to ma-
nipulate them. Nevertheless, the reasons behind rules, decisions and procedures were 
not always explicitly or uniformly communicated, which could result in misunderstand-
ings and complaints:
The only problem I’ve got like with the system is, the rules ain’t passed down right. You don’t have a 
member of staff going ‘Come here you lot, this is a new rule’. We hear half off residents who’ve over-
heard a staff member, and you’re trying to glean what this new rule is or whatever. And, you know, the 
irst time you know about it is when you’re getting told off for it (Site 4, Service User (#37)).
If efforts to exercise control through these techniques failed, drug workers would refer 
back to the documents service users signed upon entering treatment. These acted as 
leverage to persuade service users to honour their ‘contractual’ obligations. They also 
reminded them about the prospect of sanctions and provided drug workers with le-
gitimate authority to take enforcement action. From a staff perspective, contractual 
governance was beneicial because it enabled them to distance themselves from the 
intervention and thereby maintain the therapeutic relationship:
The thing that you don’t want is client/practitioner breakdown of trust … You want to be able to put 
it back on policy. So you don’t want to say … ‘I as a key worker don’t think you are doing what you 
should be doing therefore your ile’s going to be closed’. It’s about saying, ‘Hey look, really sorry Bob, 
but to go back to the stuff that we signed up to at the start, you did agree it’s part of my job as part 
of the policy … to come back and look at this and it seems that you’re not changing. I’d love to keep 
you here forever but I can’t’ … So if they do come back into the service there’s no hard feelings about 
you (Site 3, Drug Worker (#63)).
Drug workers had a range of sanctions at their disposal for dealing with non-compli-
ance. Above all else, coercive authority was based on the ability to stop providing ser-
vice users with services. This is starkly illustrated in the following interview excerpts, 
which show how the prescribing of medication could be utilized as a control technique 
as punitive as any to be found within the penal system:
Yeah, there’s elements of a power relationship sometimes between the key worker and the client; for 
instance, I’ve got the power if I don’t give you your script to make you feel very ill or to make you have 
to go out and ind £20 through crime (Site 2, Service Manager (#112)).
100ml of [methadone] is quite a lot of juice to be on every day. Then they just take it away from you. 
It’s sort of like they’ve got you over a barrel … I don’t think it should be like that (Site 2, Service User 
(#111)).
The ladder of escalation
Models of escalating sanctions were remarkably similar across the research sites and 
bore the hallmarks of the regulatory pyramid:
It’s like being at school, I guess, in some ways. You give them a little bit of a warning, and then you 
kind of escalate that warning till they understand (Site 5, Drug Worker (#87)).
FORMS OF POWER AND BEHAVIOURAL REGULATION IN DRUG TREATMENT SERVICES
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It was expected that service users would breach rules. The rationale for applying sanc-
tions was to help service users to learn from their mistakes and develop the ability to 
comply:
If you don’t have consequences, or if nobody tells you, how are you supposed to learn? [T]hat’s what 
we say anyway, when we do give warnings, we give them the opportunity to talk about it, and to offer 
them support into the reasons why that actually happened (Site 6, Drug Worker (#46)).
In the next interview excerpt, a service user is talking about receiving a sanction for 
lateness. He was outside having a cigarette, lost track of time and missed the start of a 
group session. As this had happened once before, he was required to design and run a 
session for the house on the consequences of being late. The excerpt opens with his ini-
tial frustration but goes on to emphasize the value of self-relection and peer learning:
Oh, my head fell off, I growled, I thought, you know … three minutes and you’re going to make me 
do that; at the time, I was proper pissed off and I told them about it … But I went ahead and done it 
and it made me feel great afterwards, because I started the meeting and I wrote down, for instance, 
you know, consequences of being late: I missed the chemist one day, I couldn’t get my methadone, 
because it was a weekend, so the irst thing I had to do was use drugs to mask, you know, the metha-
done, because I couldn’t rattle all weekend. So that was a consequence of that; I had to go back on 
drugs and that going back on drugs led me to keep on smoking again … [T]hen everybody else had 
to give their for instance and, like, everybody else give a different scenario… I can remember one 
saying, oh, he was late to sign on, he never got his money, he got kicked out of his hostel … [I]t was a 
really, really interesting group (Site 4, Service User (#80)).
Verbal warnings were used to interrupt minor incidents, remind service users about the 
rules and signal that more serious sanctions existed:
I believe warnings and stuff like that are there to sort of snap people, like, whatever it’s out of, denial, 
or whether it’s to wake people up, this is what you’re doing, and a chance to put them back on the 
straight and narrow (Site 6, Drug Worker (#49)).
Written warnings were a step up the ladder of escalation for failure to heed verbal 
warnings or more serious infractions. Such warnings typically took the form of a per-
sonalized letter to the service user, which communicated the reasons for the warning, 
explained the consequences and stated that any reoccurrence would result in further 
sanctions. The increased formality of the procedure was designed to exert authority 
and send a more forceful message about rules and sanctions:
As soon as you hand them that piece of paper saying ‘Due to your behaviour …’ they instantly be-
come remorseful. Because sometimes they’ve never had boundaries or rules before, and because 
they actually think of us as family, if we issue them with that, then suddenly it kicks them up the arse 
and makes them realise that no, we don’t tolerate that (Site 5, Drug Worker (#42/3)).
In four of the six research sites (2–5), behaviour contracts were used as an alternative to 
discharge when service users continued to break rules. They were not a regular feature 
of regulatory efforts as compliance was usually achieved through persuasion and warn-
ings. Contracts documented the incidents and concerns held by staff and explained 
the link between the behaviour that gave rise to the sanction and the associated con-
sequences. They also set out speciic goals and were accompanied by more intensive 
one-to-one support:
BACON AND SEDDON
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We use [behaviour contracts] as a way … to outline what it is that we’re noticing is a problem and what 
we are aiming to do together to support that … So it should almost be like a last chance contract, in a 
sense, because it really … these come up as basically the last straw for them and, yeah, it’s almost like 
setting out quite a speciic plan for them that if they don’t keep then we take that as maybe they’re 
not so motivated (Site 3, Drug Worker (#76)).
Contracts were generally supplemented by further regulatory devices. The following 
example describes the use of an ‘honesty journal’ for a resident who had abused the 
privilege of outside visits and committed an act of deception by trying to smuggle choc-
olate into the service:
He’s to do a relective piece, an honesty journal … [I]t’s starting from the point where he’s given the 
contract, how he felt about the contract. Because I know at the time he thought it was all being blown 
out of proportion. So it’s really looking at how he felt at the time, and then looking at the reasoning 
the staff gave him, how he feels about them … He’s kind of accepted that there is an issue, but we 
wanted a bit more evidence on how he’s working on that. And for this individual it’s been decided 
that he will work on this journal for the rest of his time here (Site 4, Drug Worker (#91)).
In the services where contracts were not used in this way (Sites 1 and 6), service managers 
explained that, following warnings, problematic behaviour was addressed through care 
planning and key work sessions. They viewed ‘last chance’ contracts as ‘putting up bar-
riers’ in that they ‘could be a bit of a stick to beat somebody with’, which was at odds 
with their notion of the therapeutic alliance.
Discharging service users was a last resort when efforts to gain compliance by other 
means had failed. Service users could also be immediately discharged without prior 
warning for breaking cardinal rules. Staff often found the decision dificult because 
they were aware of the risks associated with cessation of treatment. In most instances 
though, discharge actually meant a ban period and referral to another service rather 
than permanent exclusion:
That’s a scary time for a service user … if they’re coming to a service, kick off, and then leave, es-
corted out, police … whatever form that leaving takes, that’s a really vulnerable place for them. What 
happens then? Do they ever come back? Can they come back? How are they going to be received? 
And that’s for us to be mindful of and manage … But our parting message is still, please do come 
back, if you need to (Site 1, Service Manager (#103)).
Besides verbal warnings, sanctions were decided on a case-by-case basis following de-
liberation between staff. Moreover, the inal decision would not be reached until staff 
had met with the service user in question. The aim of the meeting was to determine the 
nature and implications of the incident. This involved investigating the circumstances 
around the incident, whether there was any provocation and the impact on other in-
dividuals, as well as the stage in treatment, care needs, level of engagement and atti-
tude of the service user. Honesty and expressed regret inluenced decisions about the 
response:
We had someone here once … it was time for her to go out for the day with her family, or whoever she 
was meeting. She rang up and said she had used … and it was decided she could stay because she was 
honest about it. Yet on another occasion, a guy went out – he was supposed to be going to a [Narcotics 
Anonymous] meeting, I think – used, came back, didn’t tell anyone, and then it came out that he had 
used, and was asked to leave (Site 4, Drug Worker (#94)).
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Another key purpose of the meeting was to provide the service user with an oppor-
tunity to voice their views and ensure that they understood what the intervention meant 
and why it was taking place. They were asked how they felt about the handling of the 
situation before they were asked to consent to the sanction:
You don’t want residents thinking, well, this is unfair. They still will to a degree, but it’s about us 
also looking after ourselves as staff. There needs to be reasoning behind why we’re giving someone 
a written warning. They need to be open and everyone needs to be clear why this is happening (Site 
4, Drug Worker (#91)).
Service users did occasionally express dissatisfaction when they were given sanctions. 
Some said they were disgruntled because they thought the rules being enforced were 
puerile or they disagreed with the interpretation of events. Others simply said they 
had ‘problems with authority’. Feelings of resentment emerged when service users were 
given different sanctions for the same or similar rules violations. Lack of transparency 
was an issue here. While decisions about speciic cases may well have been based on just 
grounds, the responsibility to protect client conidentiality meant that other service 
users were not privy to the factors that contributed to the outcome. Without an under-
standing of the process, ostensibly reasonable decisions could be perceived as unfair 
and inequitable.
Conclusion
Our focus in this article has been on the control practices used in drug treatment set-
tings. This focus should not be interpreted as casting doubt on the value of the care and 
support provided to drug users in treatment nor on the integrity and professionalism of 
drug workers. Indeed, during our ieldwork we saw countless examples of compassion, 
empathy and care that were inspiring and remarkable in equal measure. Nevertheless, 
our study also found that power and control were central to the everyday routine inter-
actions within drug treatment services.
The overarching picture that emerges from the study is of a complex ‘web of controls’ 
or ‘control space’ in which the behaviour of drug users in treatment is governed. The 
strategies and practices of control amounted to a form of regulation that combined a 
complementary mix of diverse forms of power (Wrong 2002) and control techniques to 
steer action and shape speciic behavioural outcomes. Deployed in a broad framework 
of responsive regulation (Ayres and Braithwaite 1992), the exercise of power sought to 
facilitate not only control and order maintenance but also care and support. This hy-
bridity might be usefully conceptualized as what Gomart (2002) termed ‘generous con-
straints’, i.e., those which aim to induce positive action rather than being solely aimed 
at oppression. Further research could interrogate the implications of such power and 
behavioural regulation for theories of addiction, treatment practice and the processes 
underpinning recovery (see e.g. West and Brown 2013; Fomiatti et al. 2019). Regulatory 
theory could also be used to enhance understandings of drug user motivation and en-
gagement with treatment.
The ways in which drug workers balanced care and control functions were remark-
ably similar to those found in penal settings. In Fielding’s (1984: 109)  classic study 
of probation practice, e.g., he demonstrates that ‘[c]ontrol is not incompatible with 
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care, and, indeed, it can be seen as a part of the caring process. Caring becomes the 
oficer’s overall stance, control a technique forming an element of it’. Our integrated 
conceptual framework—bringing together Wrong’s sociology of power with the theory 
of responsive regulation—provides an original analytical toolkit that can be used for 
research across all sites where human actors seek to regulate the behaviour of others 
over whom they have some authority.
It is perhaps a banal observation that the power and control we have described would 
not occur in the same way in many sites of health care. The key difference with drug 
treatment settings is self-evident: the social proile of its client base. In this sense, the 
strategies for controlling drug users in treatment can be understood as a form of so-
cial control and class discipline delivered through health care. As Garland (1985) has 
shown, this type of fusion of punishment and welfare is built into the historical origins 
and foundations of the welfare state, underpinning strategies for the social regulation 
of the poor. Drug treatment is, therefore, an important site for exploring the contem-
porary restructuring of welfare states (see DeVerteuil and Wilton 2009), and this is 
one lens through which to view, e.g., the complex contemporary landscape of treat-
ment service commissioning and provider conigurations. In a recent review of theoret-
ical advances in the sociology of punishment, Garland (2018: 16) argues that thinking 
about punishment and welfare and about penal control and social control, together, as 
linked phenomena is an important step forward in our understanding of penality in 
its broadest sense. Again, drug treatment potentially offers a particularly fruitful arena 
for exploring and making sense of these connections. We suggest, in conclusion, that 
Garland (2018: 23–25) himself perhaps misses a trick when he discusses the ‘war on 
drugs’ only in terms of penal and criminal justice. The casualties of that war appear 
in drug treatment services as much as they do in prison cells, and the deliberate inlic-
tion of pain is to be found in the former just as compassion is in the latter. A research 
agenda which embraces this idea will uncover drug treatment as a critical site for trans-
forming our understanding of penal power today.
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